Summary .-Compared to younger adults, older adults attend more to positive stimuli, a positivity eff ect. Older adults have limited time horizons, and they focus on maintaining positive aff ect, whereas younger adults have unlimited time horizons, and they focus on acquiring knowledge and developing skills. Time horizons were manipulated by asking participants (66 young adults, M age = 20.5 yr., SD = 1.2) to think that their lives would end in three years. Some participants focused on what they would do in these three years (life focus), whereas others focused on the fact that they would die in three years (death focus). Attentional biases to facial expressions of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and disgust were measured. Participants viewed 20 slides including pairings of a happy face with each of the negative emotions. The dependent measure was the relative attention paid to the faces on each slide. Participants in the experimental conditions exhibited a positivity eff ect compared to participants in the control condition, although some results suggested that this eff ect was weaker in the death focus condition than in the life focus condition.
In the past 25 years, considerable research has been conducted about the relationships between how much time people perceive they have left to live and their emotions and motives ( Charles & Carstensen, 2009 ; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014 ) . This research is frequently referred to as research on "time perspective" or "time horizons," and the distinction that is made most frequently is between unlimited horizons (open-ended and nebulous) and limited horizons.
3 Moreover, much of this research has focused on what is called a "positivity eff ect," typically defi ned in terms of preferences for positive over negative information in attention and memory (e.g., Carstensen & Mikels, 2005 ) . The general conclusion of this research is that limited time horizons are associated with positivity eff ects, whereas unlimited horizons are not (e.g., Reed, et al ., 2014 ) .
Research on time horizons and positivity eff ects has its origins in research on aging, and much of the research has concerned diff erences between older adults (usually 65 or older) and younger adults (usually under 30) . Compared to younger adults, older adults prefer to attend to positive stimuli and shift their attention away from negative information. Such patterns have been found in older adults' attention (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2003 ) and memory (e.g., Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004 ) . Based on a meta-analysis that included 100 studies, Reed, et al . (2014 ) concluded that "Analyses indicated that older adults show a signifi cant information processing bias toward positive vs. negative information, whereas younger adults show the opposite pattern" (p. 1).
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory
The dominant framework that has been used to understand such relationships is socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 1992 ) . According to SST, diff erences in positivity eff ects refl ect diff erences in timehorizons. Younger adults perceive the future as open-ended (an unlimited or expanded time horizon) and tend to pursue goals that will optimize their future (vs. present) rewards. In contrast, older adults tend to have a more limited time perspective that leads them to have more present-oriented goals that are more emotionally focused. These diff erences in goals lead to diff erences in preferences, i.e., "positivity eff ects." In support of SST, Reed, et al . (2014 ) found that the diff erences between younger and older adults in the strength of the positivity eff ect in a particular study were directly related to diff erences in the ages of the two groups in that study. Positivity eff ects 3 Some researchers working within the context of socioemotional selectivity theory (SST) have used the term "time perspective" to refer to the phenomenon with which the present paper is concerned. Unfortunately, in terms of clarity, "time perspective" has also been used by researchers in another distinct context that was introduced by Zimbardo and Boyd [Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory (ZTPI, 1999 ) ]. Although research within the contexts of SST and ZTPI focus on time, the two approaches do not overlap that much conceptually, particularly in terms of perceptions of the future. The ZTPI has fi ve subscales, and only one of these, Future , concerns the future. Moreover, this subscale does not assess a construct that is closely related to time perspective as operationalized by SST researchers. The Future subscale is more of a measure of delay of gratifi cation and conscientiousness than it is of people's perceptions of how long of a future they have. To make the focus of the present study clearer and to distinguish the present focus from that of research involving the ZTPI, the phrase "time horizon" is used here when referring to perceptions of the future.
were stronger in studies in which the age diff erences were larger than they were in studies in which the age diff erences were smaller.
According to SST, constraints on time horizons activate goals related to emotional meaning. Such age-related positivity eff ects have been interpreted to refl ect older adults' greater focus on emotionally meaningful goals, which leads to increases in the investment of resources to optimize emotional well-being ( Carstensen, Turan, Scheibe, Ram, Ersner-Hershfi eld, Samanez-Larkin, et al ., 2011 ) . In contrast, thinking of the future as openended (more common among younger adults) leads people to allocate resources to acquiring knowledge and to developing new skills and to pursue goals that will provide them with benefi ts in the future, even at the cost of their emotional satisfaction in the present (e.g., Carstensen, 1995 ) .
Although time horizons tend to become more limited with age, it is important to note that SST does not posit that aging per se is responsible for age diff erences in positivity. Rather, it is the change in time horizon that accompanies aging that is responsible for age-related diff erences in positivity bias. According to SST, chronological age is associated with motivational changes only because of the actuarial relationship between age and time left in life ( Carstensen, 2006 ) .
Although much of the research on relationships between positivity eff ects and time horizons has compared younger and older adults, other types of naturally occurring diff erences have been studied, sometimes within the context of "endings," i.e., the end of a stage of life such as college. For example, Pruzan and Isaacowitz (2006 ) compared positivity effects (defi ned as preferences for happy vs. sad faces) of freshmen and seniors at a U.S. college. The underlying rationale for this comparison was that seniors would have a more limited time horizon than freshmen because they were graduating sooner. Consistent with expectations, freshmen spent more time looking at sad faces than did seniors.
Although the naturally occurring groups that have been compared in these studies are meant to represent the diff erences in time horizons at the core of SST, they may also diff er in other ways that might be related to positivity eff ects. For example, older adults have probably had more relationships begin and end than have younger adults, older adults have probably known more people who have died than have younger people, etc. Freshmen and seniors have diff erent experiences with the collegiate environment, which might change their emotional dispositions.
Manipulation of Time Horizon
To avoid such confounds, researchers have manipulated the time horizons. For example, Kellough and Knight (2012 ) manipulated the time horizon by asking students ( M age = 20 yr.) to imagine that they were seniors who would be graduating the next day, which was intended to in-still a limited time horizon. They also asked older adults ( M age = 75 yr.) to imagine that a new medical advance would allow them to live 20 more years, which was intended to instill an unlimited time horizon. Positivity eff ects were measured using the emotions participants perceived in faces. They found that the unlimited time horizon manipulation reduced the positivity eff ect for older adults, although the limited time horizon manipulation did not lead to a positivity eff ect for younger adults.
In a similar vein, Fung, Carstensen, and Lutz (1999 ) manipulated the time horizon by asking younger ( M age = 30 yr.) and older adults ( M age = 62 yr.) to imagine they would live 20 years longer (the same manipulation Kellough and Knight used). Using preferences for novel and familiar social partners as an outcome, they found that older adults in whom an unlimited time perspective had been instilled preferred novel partners more than older adults in the control condition. There were no changes for younger adults. Using the same outcome measure, they also found that limiting time horizons by asking people to imagine they were emigrating soon and to imagine the end of the government in Hong Kong increased preferences for familiar interaction partners for both younger and older participants. These studies were done in Hong Kong just before Hong Kong was handed over to the PRC.
Measuring Positivity Eff ects
When examining research on time horizons and positivity eff ects, there is also the issue of how positivity eff ects have been measured. Reed, et al . (2014 ) classifi ed the methods in the studies in their meta-analysis into 30 categories. Admittedly, some methods were similar to each other (e.g., schematic faces vs. synthetic schematic faces), but even taking this into account, the phenomenon has been studied using a wide variety of measures of positivity eff ects.
The authors were primarily interested in the infl uence of time horizons on emotional states, and one of the most straightforward ways of studying such infl uences is to examine preferences for faces depicting specifi c emotions. The assumption underlying such measures is that these attentional preferences represent motives engendered by time horizons ( Light & Issacowitz, 2006 ) , and preferences for visual attention can be accurately measured using eye-tracking. Such methods have been used successfully in the past. In their study comparing freshmen and seniors, Pruzan and used eye-tracking to measure preferences for sad and happy faces. Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, and Wilson (2006a , b ) used eye-tracking methods to examine relationships between time horizons and preferences for happy, sad, and angry faces. They found that older adults (57-84 years old) tended to prefer happy faces and avoided faces expressing anger and sadness, whereas younger adults (18-21 years old) fi xated more on fearful faces.
Results of these eye-tracking studies seem to be consistent with the results of studies using other methods. For example, using a dot-probe task, Mather and Carstensen (2003 ) found that older adults (60+ years old) responded more quickly when the probe appeared behind a positive face than when it appeared behind a negative face, whereas younger adults (18-35 years old) responded to the dot probes for positive and negative faces equally quickly. In their meta-analysis, Reed, et al . (2014 ) did not examine diff erences in the positivity eff ect as a function of how positivity effects were measured.
Despite the volume of research on relationships between time horizons and the positivity eff ect, apparently none has manipulated time horizons and examined the eff ects on preferences for emotional faces. The studies by Isaacowitz and colleagues examining preferences for emotional faces ( Isaacowitz, et al ., 2006a , b ; Pruzan and Isaacowitz, 2006 ) used naturally occurring groups that were presumed to diff er in time horizons. Mather and Carstensen (2003 ) also used naturally occurring groups.
Although Kellough and Knight (2012 ) manipulated time horizons and studied emotions using facial stimuli, they did not study preferences for one emotional face over another. They measured the emotions participants perceived in faces, some of which had been morphed to increase ambiguity. Participants were given paper copies of stimuli and they listed the emotions they saw in the faces depicted. It is not clear if the procedure they used measures the positivity eff ect in the same way as it is measured in eye-tracking based studies of preference.
Current Study
To provide a strong test of the infl uence of time horizons on emotional states, the current study was conducted among younger adults (less than 25 years old) and the time horizon (limited) was manipulated. Preferences for happy faces compared to preferences for sad, angry, fearful, and disgusted faces were measured. Sad, angry, and fearful faces were included because they had been used in previous research on time horizons and positivity eff ects. Disgust was included because, as discussed below, the manipulation involved thoughts of death, and thinking of death has been found to elicit feelings of disgust (e.g., Cox, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, & Weise, 2007 ) . The manipulation of time horizon was in terms of the end of life instead of the end of a stage of life. This was intended to make the limited time horizon for the younger adult participants more comparable to the limited time horizon that is presumed to exist in older adults. It was expected that an experimentally induced limited time horizon would generate a positivity eff ect similar to that found in older adults. Specifi cally: Hypothesis 1 . Younger adults in whom a limited time horizon was instilled were expected to look more at happy faces than sad faces compared to younger adults in the condition where time horizon was not limited (not manipulated).
Previous research has compared limited to unlimited time horizons in various ways, but has not examined diff erences among diff erent ways in which limited time horizons can be defi ned. Part of the rationale of SST is that older adults recognize that their lifetimes are limited and they focus on what they will do in this remaining time. Compared to younger adults, older adults are also temporally closer to death. To understand this aspect of SST more thoroughly, in the present study the limited time horizon was manipulated in two ways. The manipulation in one condition represented the perspective that has been assumed to be typical of older people in most studies: a focus on what they will do in the time between the present and the end of their lives (life focus). In the other condition, participants were led to think about their deaths (death focus).
Hypothesis 2 . Both time horizon manipulations will lead to positivity eff ects.
The death focus condition is similar to the mortality salience manipulation used in studies of Terror Management Theory (TMT; e.g., Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004 ) . The theory posits that people employ various defense mechanisms that allow them to think of their lives as more permanent and enduring. Such mechanisms would result in a positivity eff ect similar to that predicted by SST, but for diff erent reasons. Nevertheless, as discussed by Kelley, Tang, and Schmeichel (2014 ) , research on positivity eff ects within the context of TMT and mortality salience has produced mixed results.
Hypothesis 3 . The death focus manipulation might produce weaker positivity eff ects than the life focus manipulation.
METHOD

Participants
Participants were 66 undergraduates between 19 to 21 years old (38 women; M age = 20.2 yr., SD = 0.7) who were given a chocolate bar as compensation for participation. Previous research has found diff erences between the time horizons of students in their fi rst and last years of study (e.g., Pruzan & Isaacowitz, 2006 ) , and so participants were limited to students who were in the second or third year of the fi ve-year program at the university where the study was conducted.
The eye movements of eight participants were not trackable (e.g., eyelids too close together, glasses that refl ected the tracking beam), and these participants' data were deleted from all analyses. Such a success rate (84%) is common for eye-tracking studies (e.g., Isaacowitz, 2005 ) . Of the 58 remaining participants, 20 were in the control condition, 19 were in the life focus condition, and 19 were in the death focus condition. This study was approved by the IRB at University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw.
Stimuli, Apparatus, Measurement
Emotional stimuli consisted of grayscale faces displaying fi ve emotional expressions taken from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion ( Beaupré & Hess, 2005 ) : sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and happiness. All faces were of European descent, only the neck, head, and hair of each stimulus were presented, and stimuli were presented against a dark-gray background.
The stimuli were presented in a series of 20 slides. Ten slides paired an emotional face with a matched neutral counterpart (i.e., the same person with neutral expression), fi ve female and fi ve male faces. Eight slides depicted a happy face paired with one of four negative expressions (four of each sex). Two slides presented only the neutral expressions of the same female or male face. These trials were added to control for individual differences in the preference for the left or right side of the perceptual fi eld. Order of presentation was randomized.
The gaze of the participants' dominant eye was measured using the EyeLink1000 Cl (SR Research, 1000 Hz), following a procedure developed by Miles (1929 ) . A forehead and chin rest was used to stabilize the participant's head at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm. A visual fi xation was defi ned when two consecutive saccades lasting at least 50 msec. occurred within predesignated Area of Interest (AOI) locations. In the present study, an AOI was defi ned as the whole picture of a face.
The prime dependent measure was a "fi xation ratio," the relative attention paid to one face vs. the other in a pair (see Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008 ) . For example, for pairs of pictures that involved a happy face and a sad face, this ratio was (fi xations on happy facesfi xations on sad faces)/(fi xations on happy faces + fi xations on sad faces). Using this ratio, 0 represents no preference, and a positive score indicates a preference for a happy face over a sad face.
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory and went through the procedure individually. They were told that the study was about how people perceived the future and that they would be looking at pictures. Following this, any questions were answered and consent forms were signed.
A prophecy that the world would end in December 2012 was used to manipulate time perspective. This manipulation was chosen because the movie " 2012 ," which had as its premise that a worldwide catastrophe would occur in 2012, was popular at the time the study was conducted (in February and March of 2010). In the limited life focus ( n = 19) and death focus ( n = 19) conditions, the participants were asked to assume this prophecy was true. In the life focus condition, the participants were asked to think what they would do given that they had 3 more years to live, whereas in the death focus condition the participants were asked to think what they would do given that they would die in 3 years. Feelings were not mentioned in any of the instructions because previous studies have found that focusing on emotions promotes positivity eff ects (e.g., Xing & Isaacowitz, 2006 ; Ersner-Hershfi eld, Carvel, & Isaacowitz, 2009 ) , and the eff ects of time horizon itself were of interest.
Instructions in the life focus condition were: "Recently, a lot is heard about a prophecy which says that in December 2012 the world will end. If this prophecy were to be true, it would mean that you have about 3 years of life left. What would you do, if you actually had this much time left? Write down your thoughts on the sheet below." The instructions in the death focus condition were similar, but the focus was on dying at the end of the three years. "… If indeed this prophecy were to come true, it would mean that death waits for you in 3 years. What would you do, if you really were to die in that time?…" In the control condition ( n = 20), no instructions were given other than those participants received when they were introduced to the study. "The study concerns relationships between how people perceive the future and the perception of diff erent emotions. Diff erent faces will be presented on the screen. Simply look at them when they are displayed. The study takes about 5 minutes and is completely anonymous."
The eye-tracking procedure was run immediately after the instructions were given. Participants were seated in front of a 43 cm computer screen (diagonal length), and they were asked to look at the screen as they naturally would. The presentation of the faces was counterbalanced for left and right placement of the emotional and neutral stimuli. Stimuli were presented in a randomized order, in slide-show format. Each pair of faces was presented for 4000 msec. There was 1 sec. of blank gray screen between each pair of faces. After the data were collected, the participants were told about the purpose of the study and any questions they had were answered.
Analyses
Each of the fi xation ratios was analyzed with a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), and means in each condition were compared against zero, i.e. against no diff erence in attention to the two images that were presented.
RESULTS
Attention to Happy vs. Sad Faces
Hypothesis 1 concerned diff erences in attention paid to happy and sad faces, the ANOVA of the relative attention paid to happy and sad faces produced a signifi cant main eff ect for condition ( F 2, 55 = 7.23, p < .002, η 2 = 0.21), and a planned comparison of gaze in the life focus and death focus conditions vs. the control condition was signifi cant ( F 1, 55 = 9.25, p < .004, η 2 = 0.13). Compared to control participants, participants in the two experimental conditions showed a positivity eff ect, a preference for happy over sad faces. The means for these analyses and the results of single condition tests are summarized in Table 1 .
Hypothesis 2, that limiting the time horizon would produce a positivity eff ect, was also supported by analyses of relative attention to happy vs. neutral faces. For both the life focus and death focus conditions, the mean for this measure was positive and signifi cantly diff erent from 0 ( t 18 = 2.18, p = .04, d = 0.53; t 18 = 2.10, p = .05, d = 0.52, respectively), indicating a preference for happy faces vs. neutral faces. Moreover, the means for these two conditions were the same. In contrast, for the control condition, the mean was not signifi cantly diff erent from 0 ( t 19 = 1.24, p = .23). These results need to be interpreted with some caution, however, because the ANOVA of this measure did not produce a signifi cant main eff ect for condition ( F < 1), and a planned comparison of the life focus and death focus conditions vs. the control condition was also not signifi cant ( F 1, 55 = 1.14, p = .29).
Although these analyses suggested that there was a positivity eff ect for participants in both the life focus and death focus conditions, the means and results of tests of whether means in each condition were signifi cantly diff erent from 0 suggested that the attentional biases of participants in the life focus and death focus conditions were dissimilar. As expected, participants in the life focus condition paid signifi cantly more attention to happy Note .-Results of single sample t tests are indicated for each mean in each condition, with df s of 18, 18, and 19 for the life focus, death focus, and control conditions, respectively. * p < .05. † p < .01. faces than they did to sad faces ( t 18 = 2.74, p = .01, d = 0.63), whereas participants in the death focus condition evidenced no attentional bias ( t < 1). Moreover, pairwise comparisons found that these means were marginally signifi cantly diff erent (Tukey HSD = 2.28, p = .07, d = 0.74).
It is important to note that participants in the control condition paid signifi cantly more attention to sad faces than to happy faces ( t 19 = 2.58, p = .02, d = 0.58). This diff erence (a negativity eff ect) is consistent with preferences for younger adults found in previous research (e.g., Reed, et al ., 2014 ) . Consistent with Hypothesis 3, a pairwise comparison found that the means for the life focus and control conditions were signifi cantly diff erent (Tukey HSD = 3.78, p < .001, d = 1.21), whereas the means for the death focus and control conditions were not signifi cantly diff erent (Tukey HSD = 1.45, p = .31).
Sadness vs. Other Negative Emotions
Diff erences in attention paid to happy faces as compared to attention paid to fearful, angry, and disgusted faces were also assessed. These analyses found no signifi cant eff ects for condition (all F s < 1), and only one signifi cant eff ect in one condition, preference for happy vs. disgusted faces in the life focus condition ( t 19 = 2.27, p = .04, d = 0.60). These results suggest that the attentional preferences for happy vs. sad faces found in the limited horizon condition were specifi c to sadness and not to a preference for happy faces vs. negative faces in general.
To examine this possibility further, a mixed-model ANOVA was conducted with condition as a between-subjects factor and the four outcome measures involving happiness (happy-sad, happy-fear, happy-anger, and happy-disgust) as a repeated-measure, with a planned contrast of happysad vs. the other three measures. This analysis produced a signifi cant interaction of condition and contrast ( F 2, 55 = 4.50, p = .02, η 2 = 0.14). The value of the contrast was 0.08, −0.03, and −0.11 for the life focus, death focus, and control conditions, respectively.
Follow-up tests found that this contrast was signifi cantly diff erent from 0 for the control condition ( t 19 = 2.73, p = .01, d = 0.55), it was marginally signifi cant for the life-focus condition ( t 18 = 1.78, p = .09, d = 0.39), and it was not signifi cant for the death focus condition ( t < 1). The results of paired comparisons were similar to the results of paired comparisons of the happy-sad measure. The life-focus and control conditions were significantly diff erent (Tukey HSD = 2.99, p = .01, d = 0.94), the death-focus and controls were not (Tukey HSD < 1), and the life-focus and death-focus conditions were not signifi cantly diff erent (Tukey HSD = 1.71, p = .21).
Death Focus Condition
Given that few studies of positivity eff ects in attentional processes have used a manipulation similar to the death focus condition of the pres-ent study, specifi c post hoc analyses were conducted focusing on this condition. The fi rst of these analyses examined whether there was any attentional preference, i.e., if the mean for a condition diff ered from zero. In addition to the preference for happy vs. neutral faces reported previously, these analyses found that participants in the death focus condition had an attentional preference to fearful and disgusted faces compared to neutral faces. The fi xation ratios were 0.10 and 0.12, respectively, with the following test statistics ( t 18 = 2.95, p = .009 and t 18 = 3.50, p = .003, respectively). These preferences must be viewed with caution. For the fear-neutral preference, there was no signifi cant main eff ect for condition ( F < 1). For the disgust-neutral preference, the main eff ect for condition did not reach conventional levels of signifi cance ( F 2, 55 = 3.01, p = .06, η 2 = 0.10). DISCUSSION As predicted, young adults who imagined that their lives would end in three years exhibited a positivity eff ect when viewing faces portraying diff erent emotional expressions. Such fi ndings are consistent with previous research (e.g., Pruzan & Isaacowitz, 2006 ; Reed, et al ., 2014 ) , and support the claim that shortening people's time horizons changes their motivational states.
The present study adds to our knowledge of this phenomenon in important ways. Many of the existing studies on this topic have relied upon naturally occurring groups that have been presumed to vary in terms of time horizon such as older vs. younger adults ( Reed, et al ., 2014 ) and fi rst-year and graduating students (e.g., Pruzan & Isaacowitz, 2006 ) . Although using such naturally occurring groups can enhance external validity, it can also undermine internal validity. As discussed previously, diff erences between the groups other than time horizon could have been responsible for diff erences that were presumed to be due to diff erences in time perspective. The current study's experimental procedure controlled such possibilities.
Although the primary hypothesis concerned attention to happy and sad faces, positivity eff ects were examined as defi ned in terms of other negative emotions that have been used in studies of time horizons. With only one exception (happy vs. disgust in the life focus condition), no positivity eff ects were found for negative emotions other than sadness. These results suggest that the positivity eff ects created by limited time horizons are specifi c to sadness. Similar to previous studies of the infl uence of time horizon, the only positive emotion studied was happiness. Nevertheless, the fact that diff erent results were found for diff erent negative emotions highlights the importance of specifi city in studying the eff ect of time horizons. It would seem to be important to know if the infl uence of a limited time perspective is limited to specifi c emotions (i.e., happiness and sad-ness), or if this infl uence includes other emotions, particularly other positive emotions.
When considering the results of the present study, the power of the present design needs to be taken into account. Using G*Power ( Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007 ) , for three groups with 60 participants, the power of the present design was estimated to be 0.37 for a medium eff ect (0.25 d ). More participants would have provided more power to detect differences among the conditions. In addition, there were only two trials for each of the specifi c stimulus pairs. More observations (trials) would have provided a more reliable basis for estimating the parameters.
The infl uences of methods used to shorten time horizons on positivity eff ects were also examined. In the life focus condition, participants thought about what they would do given that they had 3 more years to live, and in the death focus condition they thought about what they would do given that they would die in 3 years. In terms of the prime dependent measure (attention to happy vs. sad faces), the death focus condition eliminated the positivity eff ect. Nevertheless, some results suggested that focusing on death rather than time left to live may have led to some positivity eff ects. Participants in both experimental conditions attended more to happy faces than to neutral faces, whereas participants in the control condition did not. When considering these fi ndings, the lack of a signifi cant diff erence between the two experimental conditions and the control condition must be taken into account.
The results for the death focus condition suggest that participants may have simultaneously experienced happiness and sadness. Although some models of emotion describe happiness and sadness as mutually exclusive, opposite poles of a continuum (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 1999 ) , it has been found that people can experience both simultaneously (e.g., Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001 ) . In terms of studies of attentional bias, the results for the death focus condition may refl ect a type of mix of emotions that have been found in studies of poignancy (e.g., Ersner-Hershfi eld, et al ., 2009 ) . Poignancy is a mix of positive and negative emotions, and focusing on death may have elicited such a mix.
Focusing on death also led participants to attend more to faces portraying disgust. This is consistent with previous research that has found that people experience disgust when faced with their mortality (e.g., Cox, et al ., 2007 ) . Furthermore, the fact that participants in the death focus condition attended more to fearful and to happy faces (than neutral faces) is consistent with research on terror management, indicating that mortality salience evokes fear with which people cope by making themselves feel good and happy (e.g., Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003 ) .
The fi ndings in this study support the principle tenets of socioemotional selection theory and suggest directions for future research. Specifically, the results support the contention that the positivity eff ects found in previous studies among older adults were due to older adults having a more limited time horizon than younger adults. Moreover, the present results raise questions about the exact nature of the limited time horizons that have been studied thus far. Leading participants to think about death itself, rather than the time left until death, reduced the positivity eff ect created by a limited time horizon.
This study suggests that there is a link between the eff ects of thinking of the end of life as considered by socioemotional selectivity and terror management theories. Given that both theories concern (or can concern) the end of life, further and more formal integration of the two perspectives could be fruitful. For example, how do the eff ects of shortened time perspective as conceptualized by SST combine with the eff ects of mortality salience as conceptualized by terror management? Under what circumstances will one set of infl uences predominate over the other? Answering such questions will require studies explicitly designed to address them.
